The board would not start against any existing database, so Caddy had
nothing to proxy to and answered 502. Reproduced by rebuilding the
server's database from the previous schema and starting the app the way
gunicorn does.
The cause is one line of schema.sql:
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS attachments_message ON attachments(message_id)
IF NOT EXISTS guards the index NAME, not the column. On a database whose
attachments table predates message_id, executescript dies with "no such
column" — before any migration could add it, because init_db runs the
schema first by design. Every index on a column a migration introduces
belongs in the migration, after the column exists. It now lives there,
outside the rebuild branch so a freshly created database gets it too.
Second bug, latent and worse: the rebuild set PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF
inside the transaction, where it is documented to be a no-op. It looked
applied and did nothing. Moved outside BEGIN. The test fixture had been
passing for the wrong reason — it left foreign keys at SQLite's default,
which is off — and now turns them on as connect() does.
Both are the same mistake in different clothes: the tests exercised
migrations.apply directly, so nothing ever ran init_db against a
database from before the change. That test exists now. It builds the
previous schema, inserts the row the server actually has, starts the
app, and asserts the photo survived and a restart is a no-op. Verified
by reinstating the bad line and watching it fail with the same error the
server gave.
230 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
An inbox between two members — conversations, per-person unread marks,
photos, blocking. Not live chat: that needs a connection held open per
signed-in member, which the sync workers cannot do.
Membership of the conversation is the whole access rule and is checked on
every hit, answering 404 rather than 403 so a member cannot tell a
conversation that is not theirs from one that does not exist. A picture
in a private message is checked the same way: on the board being signed
in is enough, here it is nowhere near.
Blocking is symmetric. One row stops both directions, and you can only
lift your own. A block that silenced only the blocked person would leave
the blocker writing freely, which is a megaphone rather than a safety
feature. Enforced in the handlers, with a test that posts from a page
held open from before the block.
Erasing a member deletes their private messages, both sides, and their
pictures off disk. A thread outlives its author because other people
replied; a two-party exchange has no remainder, and keeping half of
erased correspondence is what erasure exists to prevent. The guard added
in c9c549e did its job: it failed the moment the new tables landed and
named all four columns.
The part that needed care: schema.sql is all CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS,
so it can add a table and nothing else. Every change so far happened to
be a new table. Letting an attachment belong to a message is not — and
SQLite cannot do it in place, because the table carries a CHECK
constraint and there is no DROP CONSTRAINT. Verified before building on
it: ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN succeeds and the next insert is refused.
So migrations.py, numbered steps recorded in PRAGMA user_version, run
after the schema so a fresh database finds its work already done. Step 1
rebuilds attachments the documented way. Tested against a database built
in the old shape with rows in it, because a migration tested only on a
fresh database is tested against the one case it was never needed for —
including that the rebuilt CHECK is as strict as the one it replaced.
229 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Deleting a member returned 500. The cause is mine and hours old:
attachments.uploaded_by is NOT NULL and does not cascade, so once
somebody has posted a photo SQLite refuses to delete their row.
erase_member knew about threads, comments and created_by — every table
that existed when it was written — and Phase B added a fourth without
telling it.
Reproduced before fixing: a member with a thread erases cleanly, the
same member with an attachment raises FOREIGN KEY constraint failed.
The picture is reassigned to the tombstone rather than deleted, the same
rule the words around it already follow: the thread survives as "Miembro
eliminado" and keeps its shape. Removing the picture means deleting the
post it hangs off.
The lists of columns to reassign and to clear are now module constants
that erase_member iterates, and a test reads the live schema with PRAGMA
foreign_key_list and fails if any table points at members(id), does not
cascade, and is not in them. Checked against the pre-fix lists: it names
attachments.uploaded_by. The next table to be added will fail a test
instead of a button — and this one failed at the moment somebody
exercised a right they are entitled to, which is the worst time to
find out.
201 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
"Cerrar sesión del todo" linked straight to /user/logout on the account
server. That route is POST-only — verified in Gitea 1.22's router, which
registers m.Post("/logout", auth.SignOut) and no GET at all — so the
click was a GET, the answer was 404, and the session it promised to end
carried on untouched. It shipped in 724dada, in the commit whose message
was about not overstating what Salir does.
It cannot be repaired by turning the link into a form: the POST needs a
CSRF token belonging to that other domain, unreadable from here by
design. So the page stops pretending and gives the instruction — go
there, open the profile menu, choose Cerrar sesión — which is what the
small print underneath already said.
server-setup.md contained the whole answer and contradicted itself: one
paragraph states the logout is POST-only "so a link cannot trigger it",
and two paragraphs later promises "the link that finishes the job". The
code followed the wrong half.
Worse, a test asserted "/user/logout" in page, so the suite was
enforcing the defect rather than catching it. That assertion is now
inverted, and a template guard fails the build if any template links
there again.
199 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Two findings from one screenshot of a dead forgot-password page.
The page is Gitea's own, and it will always say recovery is disabled:
the SMTP details are the members area's, and Gitea is a different
container with no mailer and no need for one. But every member reaches
Gitea's sign-in form on the way in, and that form links to it — so the
broken route is the one they find first. The theme now hides the link.
Ours, which works, is /comunidad/recuperar.
The footer on that page still advertised the software and its version,
which proves the settings added days ago never reached the server.
/srv/gitea/docker-compose.yml is a copy and nothing ever synced it:
deploy-board.sh syncs the board's compose file, and the Gitea directory
has been hand-made since setup. CORS, the theme, OpenID, the register
button, the footer — committed, documented, never applied. The file
stays valid and the container stays healthy, which is why nobody
noticed. scripts/deploy-gitea.sh syncs it, restarts, and then reads the
settings back out of the running container and prints them, because
this session has lost three separate afternoons to settings that were
accepted somewhere and read by nobody.
Separately: an invitation was only ever issued when the app created the
account. Make the account by hand, add the member with the box
unticked, and no invitation exists and none can be made — which is
exactly how somebody ended up with an account nobody knew the password
to. Miembros now has "Enviar invitación" on any active member with an
address, for that case and for a failed send, an expired link or a
corrected address. Issuing a new token voids the old one, so a
forwarded link stops working. Refused before a token is issued when
there is no address, since otherwise a working invitation would be
spent on one that cannot be delivered.
183 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Phase B. Images on threads and comments, stored in /data/uploads —
inside the volume that already holds board.db, so there is one directory
to back up rather than two and no second mount to remember.
Not in the site repository, which is the distinction that matters: the
content editor uploads by committing, and a private photo committed
there would go through the build pipeline and out onto vienalatina.com.
The type is decided by the first bytes, not the filename. content.py
trusts the extension, which is tolerable where Hugo serves the result;
here we serve it back, so an HTML file called gato.png would be a script
running on our own origin. Five magic-number checks, no new dependency.
The uploaded name is kept only as text to show a person; the name on
disk is generated. Staging is separate from saving so a refused picture
cannot leave a half-made thread behind.
Threads and comments are soft-deleted, so the serving route checks the
parent is still live. Without it, taking a post down leaves its photo
readable by anyone who noted the URL.
And the hole this phase existed to close: backup-board.sh archived
board.db and nothing else, so the first upload would have made the
nightly backup silently incomplete while still reporting success. It now
archives the uploads directory too, verifies the archive, and names the
directory when it is empty rather than passing over it in silence.
Tested by restoring: destroyed the directory, restored from the archive,
compared bytes.
IMAGE_EXTENSIONS moves to uploads.py and content.py imports it, so the
editor and the board cannot drift apart about what counts as a picture.
46 new tests, 176 in total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
A member signing in has no idea what Gitea is, and for anyone this
platform is ever sold to it is a competitor's name on their login page.
Fourteen strings named it — a button, a logout page, an account-creation
notice and eleven error messages — plus Gitea's own sign-in and
authorize screens, which every member passes through.
Ours are reworded: "el servidor de cuentas" where the thing has to be
referred to at all, and nothing where it did not. Gitea's own screens
take APP_NAME plus the two footer switches, which are supported settings
rather than a patched template. APP_NAME goes in app.ini's unnamed root
section, spelled DEFAULT in the environment mapping, so the docs carry a
command to confirm it landed — a key written to a section that does not
exist is accepted in silence.
Comments, docstrings, column names and env vars keep the real name. The
code has to stay honest about what it talks to, none of it reaches a
browser, and renaming gitea_login would mean a migration for nothing.
Two guards added, since this is the kind of thing that creeps back one
error message at a time: no template renders the word outside a Jinja
comment, and no string literal outside a docstring contains it. Checked
against the previous commit, where they catch the one message that had
already been missed by hand.
Licence: MIT, no attribution-in-UI clause, and we redistribute nothing —
the official image runs unmodified with its own LICENSE intact. Gitea
ships the "powered by" switch itself. Reasoning recorded in §12.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
A member followed his invitation link, chose a password, typed it twice,
pressed save, and was shown the name of an environment variable. The
server knew from the first byte of that request that it could not save
anything: without GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN it cannot set a password in Gitea.
It asked him to do the work anyway.
Three places had the same shape, all now checked up front through a new
gitea.admin_configured(), mirroring mail.configured():
- the invitation page answers 503 with an explanation and no password
field, identically for a real and an invented token so it cannot be
used to probe for live ones
- /recuperar refuses instead of mailing a link to a page that could only
apologise — and its deliberately identical answer would have hidden
that from the admin as well as the member
- the sign-in page stops offering recovery it cannot complete
Also: a 404 from admin_set_password now names the real cause. A member
added without "crear también su cuenta" has no Gitea account, so the
password change is aimed at nothing, and "Gitea rechazó el cambio de
contraseña (404)" blames Gitea for an account that was never made.
deploy-board.sh warns about settings that are present but empty. The
previous check looked for missing names, and GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN= has a
name — which is why the deploy that led to this said nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
main carries the previous deploy's merge commit and the branch carries
the new work, so a git with no pull.rebase configured stops with "fatal:
Need to specify how to reconcile divergent branches" and fetches without
merging. --no-edit does not answer that question; --no-rebase does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
The server's main tracks gitea/main while new work lands on a branch on
GitHub, so a bare `git pull` asks Gitea, finds it level, and answers
"Already up to date." That sentence is true about the wrong remote and
reads exactly like there is nothing to fetch — which is how the last
deploy stalled on a script that had never arrived.
Step 8 now names a `github` remote beside `gitea`, and the update recipe
in 11.3 pulls from it by name with --no-edit, pushes to gitea, then
rebuilds. 11.3 previously said plain `git pull`, as though the server
tracked GitHub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Two silent failures sitting between Phase A and a working invitation.
The compose file never passed MAIL_* through. Compose does not give a
container the contents of .env — it only substitutes into the compose
file — so the settings could be filled in correctly and read by nobody,
with the app reporting mail as unconfigured and the values sitting right
there on disk. test_deployment.py now fails the build whenever
.env.example and docker-compose.yml drift apart, which is how this
happened and how it would happen again.
The app's code is baked into the image (COPY apps /srv/apps), so a pull
followed by --force-recreate runs the old code and says nothing. Added
scripts/deploy-board.sh: rebuild, sync the compose file, restart, print
the log, and name any setting present in .env.example and missing from
the live .env. It never touches .env itself.
Also: "no mail server configured" is now told apart from "the mail
server refused". They want different things done about them, and the
first one sent an admin looking for an SMTP error that never existed.
The new-member form says so before it is filled in rather than after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Until now an admin created an account, the password appeared once on screen,
and that was the only copy. Gitea's Forgot password answers "Account recovery
is disabled because no email is set up", because this server has never been
able to send mail. Every route a member had to a password of their own was
closed, which made the members area unusable by anyone not standing next to the
owner.
Now: the admin enters a username and an email, the server creates the Gitea
account with a random password nobody ever sees — the admin included — and the
member is emailed a link to a Viena Latina page where they choose their own.
The same mechanism gives "¿Olvidaste tu contraseña?" that works, replacing
Gitea's dead page. Nobody leaves the site for either, which is possible because
PATCH /admin/users/{username} accepts a password.
A link is enough to take an account, so it is treated as a credential: single
use, short-lived, stored only as a SHA-256, and invalidated when a newer one is
issued so an older email stops working. SHA-256 rather than a password hash
because these are 32 random bytes, not something a person chose — there is no
dictionary to slow down. Recovery answers identically for a known and an
unknown address, or the form becomes a way to enumerate members one address at
a time, and stops after three tries so it cannot be used to mail-bomb somebody
using this server's reputation.
Rejecting a password deliberately does not spend the token. A typo must not
lock somebody out of an account they have never reached.
If the mail fails the admin is shown the link instead. The account exists
either way, so the difference is between a delayed invitation and a person who
simply never gets in.
Found while testing: the rate limit did not work at all. created_at is written
by SQLite as "2026-09-25 15:00:00" and I compared it against Python's
"2026-09-25T15:00:00+00:00"; a space sorts before T, so every row looked older
than any threshold and the limit silently never fired. It is now compared
inside SQLite, where the format and the clock are the same one.
Also drops two tabs from the sign-in page: OpenID, which nobody here will use,
and Register, which contradicted DISABLE_REGISTRATION and invited people to try
something the server then refused.
Verified: 126 checks. Tokens are hashed at rest, work once, expire, die when
reissued, and are refused for a suspended member; a short password and a Gitea
rejection both leave the link usable; recovery is indistinguishable for known
and unknown addresses and stops at three; creating a member emails them and
shows no password; a failed send surfaces the link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Running without GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN is the safer configuration and is documented
as such, but the member form did not know: it offered "Crear también su cuenta"
ticked by default and reported "Falta GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN" only on submit, after
three fields had been filled in.
That is the shape of failure this project has lost the most time to — something
that cannot happen, going unsaid until someone has relied on it. The form now
reads the config when it renders and says so, with a link to Gitea's create-user
page.
The checkbox is disabled rather than hidden, because "you cannot do this here"
is more use than an option that quietly is not there. The refusal itself stays
in the handler: a disabled input is a courtesy, and a hand-crafted POST still
meets the same error.
Verified: 104 checks. The form states the limit with no token and is unchanged
with one, and submitting create_account anyway still creates no member.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
The install script read /app/gitea/public/assets/css/theme-gitea-light.css out
of the container. The official image compiles its static assets into the gitea
binary, so that path does not exist and the script could never have worked —
it would have failed on its own "could not read Gitea's own theme" check,
which at least pointed somewhere, but at the wrong thing entirely.
Fetching the file from the running server instead works whether the assets are
embedded or on disk, and has the better property besides: what the server
serves is by definition the version that is running, which is the whole reason
the base is not kept in this repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Two halves of the same complaint: the journey into the members area does not
feel like one platform.
Members sign in to /comunidad/ through Gitea, so Gitea's sign-in form and
authorize dialog are part of everyone's journey, not just of anyone who opens a
repository. That is what the earlier "is Gitea only for admins?" question got
wrong. Unthemed they are two dark screens in the middle of a cream site.
Unlike Decap, Gitea supports being themed, so this needs no forking and nothing
a release can silently undo. The repository holds only the colour overrides;
scripts/gitea-theme.sh concatenates them onto the light theme it reads out of
the running container. Keeping somebody else's stylesheet in here would go
stale and turn every Gitea upgrade into a merge — the script is re-run instead,
which is one line in the upgrade notes. Getting a variable name wrong leaves a
corner grey rather than breaking a page, which is the failure mode worth having
when the names belong to someone else's project.
The logo is the site's wordmark, as live text in the same font stack rather than
traced to paths: the site loads no webfont at all, deliberately, so visitors
already see it in whatever sans-serif their machine substitutes. Paths would
render a Montserrat most people never see on the site itself.
Salir was the sharper problem. It cleared this session and the stored token, and
then said "Sesión cerrada" — while the Gitea session in the same browser stayed
open and Gitea still remembered the authorisation, so one click signed the next
person straight back in with no password. On a laptop shared around an
association, that button was lying.
It cannot be fixed from here. Gitea's logout has been POST-only since 1.11.2, so
a link cannot trigger it and a cross-site POST needs a CSRF token this app does
not have; prompt=login is undocumented in every released version of Gitea's
OAuth2 provider, and a security control should not rest on that. So the logout
page now says exactly what is closed and what is not, and links to the one place
that finishes it. Being honest about a limit beats a reassuring message that is
false.
Verified: 101 checks, two of them new — logout warns rather than redirecting,
and leaves no token the server could still act with. The theme itself is
visual and has to be looked at; docs/server-setup.md §12 says where.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Decap looks like a different product because it cannot be made to look like
this one: its maintainer's answer is override the CSS and accept that class
names move between releases, or fork it and carry that forever. Neither is
worth building on, so editing moves into the app that already has the site's
design and this project's tests.
Posts are files in git, so the editor is a form that commits a file through
Gitea's contents API. No working copy, no queue, no new state, and no way for
the pipeline to tell which editor wrote the file — which is what makes running
both at once safe. Decap keeps working; nothing here removes it, and the
fallback if something is missing is switching tabs.
Filenames and frontmatter are not this module's to invent. They are the
contract scripts/translate.py reads: `<basename>.es.md` is what split_lang()
parses, the date prefix is what keeps two posts with one title off a single
URL, and the absence of `translated_from` is what marks a file as something a
person wrote. Several tests import translate.py and run its own parser over
what the editor produced, because a file it cannot parse publishes in Spanish
and is never translated, with nothing reported anywhere.
Commits carry the writer's own Gitea account rather than a bot's, so history
says who wrote each post and Gitea's permissions apply unchanged. That needs
their access token, which lives in the database and never in a cookie: Flask
signs cookies but does not encrypt them, and a token is enough to commit as its
owner. Gitea expires tokens after about an hour, so they refresh ahead of
expiry and retry once on rejection — without that, saving would start failing
partway through an afternoon for no reason the writer could see.
Publishing is admin-only. Posting to the internal board and publishing to the
public site are different permissions, and the second is the larger grant.
Listing caches frontmatter against the git blob sha, because the contents API
returns names without bodies: that turns one request per post on every page
load into one request in total, and needs no invalidation, since a sha changes
only when the file does.
Verified: 97 checks. The filename translate.py parses, an authored source that
is_generated() rejects, the freeze toggle round-tripping, a stale sha refused
with the other edit intact, six filename shapes that must 404 including a
generated sibling, plain members refused, an SVG rejected as an image, uploads
not colliding, the cache reading each file once and refreshing when it changes,
and a preview that renders markdown, escapes script tags and publishes nothing.
Smoke-tested live: routes register and gate correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Everything on this site so far has been a file built from git. This is the
first component that runs code to answer a request and the first whose data
git does not hold, so the trade is stated in the README and the backup script
is not optional.
Roles are owner, admin and user. The owner is seeded once from BOARD_OWNER and
cannot be seeded again, because otherwise editing a compose file would be a
quieter way to take the top role than asking for it; ownership moves only by
transfer, inside the app. There is exactly one owner and a partial unique index
enforces it, so the invariant holds even when a handler is wrong. The owner is
beyond suspension and demotion by everyone, themselves included. Only the owner
makes admins; admins make users.
Sign-in goes through Gitea as a confidential OAuth client — the opposite of
Decap, which has to be public because it runs in the browser. The rule the
whole thing rests on is that a Gitea account is not a membership: entry needs
an active row in `members`, or every account on the instance is a member,
starting with the translations bot.
Admins can delete any post; nobody can edit anyone else's, admins included.
Taking a post down is visible to its author. Quietly rewriting it is not, and
an admin who could do that could leave a sentence attributed to someone who
never wrote it. The plan said admins could do both; this is the one place the
implementation departs from it.
Markdown renders with raw HTML disabled, which is the entire XSS defence and
the reason there is no sanitiser: the renderer emits only its own tags and
escapes the rest. The CSP carries no 'unsafe-inline', which makes an inline
onsubmit silently inert rather than broken, so the confirmation dialogs live in
a static file and a test fails any template that grows an inline handler.
GDPR is in scope rather than deferred: erasure removes the member row and moves
their authorship to a tombstone so the conversations around them still read,
and any member can download their own writing.
Verified: 63 checks pass, covering the membership gate, every role predicate, a
direct insert of a second owner being refused by the index, atomic ownership
transfer, CSRF, an offsite login redirect, script tags rendering as text, soft
deletes leaving both listings and exports, and the member screens rendering for
each role. Smoke-tested live: headers, both static assets, and the bare
/comunidad redirect that the Caddy matcher has to cover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
Deleting a post in Decap removes one file: the Spanish original. The German
and Portuguese versions were written by this script, so nothing else deletes
them, and they stayed on the site as posts in a language with no original —
/de/ and /pt-br/ kept listing articles that no longer exist in Spanish.
The pipeline had no concept of removal at all. changed_markdown() filters the
push diff to A and M, so a deletion never reached the translate step; a push
that only deletes posts arrived with no sources and returned early, which is
precisely the case that leaves siblings stranded.
Siblings are now reaped by scanning the content tree for a translated_from
whose source file is gone, which also clears debris from earlier runs and from
renames. A frozen sibling is reported rather than deleted: someone edited that
translation by hand, and throwing the work away on an inference is worse than
leaving one stale page until they remove it themselves. The reaper runs even
when nothing was translated, and commit_and_push stages with --all so a
vanished path commits as a deletion.
Verified: reaps both siblings of a deleted source, keeps siblings whose source
is alive, keeps a frozen orphan, never touches a human-authored original.
16/16 pipeline and 15/15 markdown checks still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
