b90cbd2a9f
7 Commits
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Claude
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b90cbd2a9f
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One front door: the members area owns its own logins
Three complaints, one cause. Logging out could not finish because the session belonged to another server, whose logout is POST-only and unreachable from here. "Ese usuario ya está en uso" for somebody absent from Miembros, because erase_member deleted our row and left the git account standing — two stores of users, one of them showing. And the hand-off to a differently-designed domain, with a Forgot password that could never work. All three followed from delegating identity, so it is no longer delegated. Members now sign in at /comunidad/login against a scrypt hash in our own database, via werkzeug.security, which arrives with Flask. They have no account on the git server at all, which makes the collision impossible rather than fixed. Logout is one click. This removes more than it adds: the OAuth round trip, the client registration, tokens.py with its refresh-before-expiry logic, the gitea_tokens table, and the logged-out page that existed to apologise for a logout that did not log you out. The editor keeps per-writer attribution without per-writer tokens: one CONTENT_TOKEN commits, and each commit names its author, which Gitea's contents API supports and a test now asserts. CONTENT_TOKEN falls back to GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN so nothing breaks on deploy, but it only needs write access to one repository, while the admin token can modify every account on the instance — and now has no remaining job. The refusals are the interesting part. Unknown name, wrong password, suspended member and invited-but-never-arrived all answer identically, asserted by comparing the rendered bytes. The hash check runs against a decoy even when there is no such member, so an unknown name does not answer faster. Attempts are rate limited, counted inside SQLite for the reason invites.py documents. A NULL hash never matches anything. Migration 2 adds password_hash and drops the dead OAuth tokens. Everyone starts NULL, including the owner, so scripts/set-password.sh exists and was tested before this could ship: it prompts without echo, never takes the password as an argument where ps would show it, and refuses a short one or an unknown member. Rehearsed against a rebuilt copy of the server's database: starts, keeps the photo, drops the tokens table, serves a login form with no redirect, signs in, signs out, stays out. 223 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn |
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Claude
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73ad25a15a
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Fix the start-up crash Phase C shipped, and test for it
The board would not start against any existing database, so Caddy had nothing to proxy to and answered 502. Reproduced by rebuilding the server's database from the previous schema and starting the app the way gunicorn does. The cause is one line of schema.sql: CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS attachments_message ON attachments(message_id) IF NOT EXISTS guards the index NAME, not the column. On a database whose attachments table predates message_id, executescript dies with "no such column" — before any migration could add it, because init_db runs the schema first by design. Every index on a column a migration introduces belongs in the migration, after the column exists. It now lives there, outside the rebuild branch so a freshly created database gets it too. Second bug, latent and worse: the rebuild set PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF inside the transaction, where it is documented to be a no-op. It looked applied and did nothing. Moved outside BEGIN. The test fixture had been passing for the wrong reason — it left foreign keys at SQLite's default, which is off — and now turns them on as connect() does. Both are the same mistake in different clothes: the tests exercised migrations.apply directly, so nothing ever ran init_db against a database from before the change. That test exists now. It builds the previous schema, inserts the row the server actually has, starts the app, and asserts the photo survived and a restart is a no-op. Verified by reinstating the bad line and watching it fail with the same error the server gave. 230 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn |
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Claude
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5ab9e3cab5
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Phase C: private messages, with blocking and photos
An inbox between two members — conversations, per-person unread marks,
photos, blocking. Not live chat: that needs a connection held open per
signed-in member, which the sync workers cannot do.
Membership of the conversation is the whole access rule and is checked on
every hit, answering 404 rather than 403 so a member cannot tell a
conversation that is not theirs from one that does not exist. A picture
in a private message is checked the same way: on the board being signed
in is enough, here it is nowhere near.
Blocking is symmetric. One row stops both directions, and you can only
lift your own. A block that silenced only the blocked person would leave
the blocker writing freely, which is a megaphone rather than a safety
feature. Enforced in the handlers, with a test that posts from a page
held open from before the block.
Erasing a member deletes their private messages, both sides, and their
pictures off disk. A thread outlives its author because other people
replied; a two-party exchange has no remainder, and keeping half of
erased correspondence is what erasure exists to prevent. The guard added
in
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Claude
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9355121b7c
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Let members post pictures, and back them up
Phase B. Images on threads and comments, stored in /data/uploads — inside the volume that already holds board.db, so there is one directory to back up rather than two and no second mount to remember. Not in the site repository, which is the distinction that matters: the content editor uploads by committing, and a private photo committed there would go through the build pipeline and out onto vienalatina.com. The type is decided by the first bytes, not the filename. content.py trusts the extension, which is tolerable where Hugo serves the result; here we serve it back, so an HTML file called gato.png would be a script running on our own origin. Five magic-number checks, no new dependency. The uploaded name is kept only as text to show a person; the name on disk is generated. Staging is separate from saving so a refused picture cannot leave a half-made thread behind. Threads and comments are soft-deleted, so the serving route checks the parent is still live. Without it, taking a post down leaves its photo readable by anyone who noted the URL. And the hole this phase existed to close: backup-board.sh archived board.db and nothing else, so the first upload would have made the nightly backup silently incomplete while still reporting success. It now archives the uploads directory too, verifies the archive, and names the directory when it is empty rather than passing over it in silence. Tested by restoring: destroyed the directory, restored from the archive, compared bytes. IMAGE_EXTENSIONS moves to uploads.py and content.py imports it, so the editor and the board cannot drift apart about what counts as a picture. 46 new tests, 176 in total. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn |
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Claude
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e95c732c6f
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Let members get a password of their own
Until now an admin created an account, the password appeared once on screen,
and that was the only copy. Gitea's Forgot password answers "Account recovery
is disabled because no email is set up", because this server has never been
able to send mail. Every route a member had to a password of their own was
closed, which made the members area unusable by anyone not standing next to the
owner.
Now: the admin enters a username and an email, the server creates the Gitea
account with a random password nobody ever sees — the admin included — and the
member is emailed a link to a Viena Latina page where they choose their own.
The same mechanism gives "¿Olvidaste tu contraseña?" that works, replacing
Gitea's dead page. Nobody leaves the site for either, which is possible because
PATCH /admin/users/{username} accepts a password.
A link is enough to take an account, so it is treated as a credential: single
use, short-lived, stored only as a SHA-256, and invalidated when a newer one is
issued so an older email stops working. SHA-256 rather than a password hash
because these are 32 random bytes, not something a person chose — there is no
dictionary to slow down. Recovery answers identically for a known and an
unknown address, or the form becomes a way to enumerate members one address at
a time, and stops after three tries so it cannot be used to mail-bomb somebody
using this server's reputation.
Rejecting a password deliberately does not spend the token. A typo must not
lock somebody out of an account they have never reached.
If the mail fails the admin is shown the link instead. The account exists
either way, so the difference is between a delayed invitation and a person who
simply never gets in.
Found while testing: the rate limit did not work at all. created_at is written
by SQLite as "2026-09-25 15:00:00" and I compared it against Python's
"2026-09-25T15:00:00+00:00"; a space sorts before T, so every row looked older
than any threshold and the limit silently never fired. It is now compared
inside SQLite, where the format and the clock are the same one.
Also drops two tabs from the sign-in page: OpenID, which nobody here will use,
and Register, which contradicted DISABLE_REGISTRATION and invited people to try
something the server then refused.
Verified: 126 checks. Tokens are hashed at rest, work once, expire, die when
reissued, and are refused for a suspended member; a short password and a Gitea
rejection both leave the link usable; recovery is indistinguishable for known
and unknown addresses and stops at three; creating a member emails them and
shows no password; a failed send surfaces the link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
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Claude
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635372d7a2
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Write the site from the members area instead of Decap
Decap looks like a different product because it cannot be made to look like this one: its maintainer's answer is override the CSS and accept that class names move between releases, or fork it and carry that forever. Neither is worth building on, so editing moves into the app that already has the site's design and this project's tests. Posts are files in git, so the editor is a form that commits a file through Gitea's contents API. No working copy, no queue, no new state, and no way for the pipeline to tell which editor wrote the file — which is what makes running both at once safe. Decap keeps working; nothing here removes it, and the fallback if something is missing is switching tabs. Filenames and frontmatter are not this module's to invent. They are the contract scripts/translate.py reads: `<basename>.es.md` is what split_lang() parses, the date prefix is what keeps two posts with one title off a single URL, and the absence of `translated_from` is what marks a file as something a person wrote. Several tests import translate.py and run its own parser over what the editor produced, because a file it cannot parse publishes in Spanish and is never translated, with nothing reported anywhere. Commits carry the writer's own Gitea account rather than a bot's, so history says who wrote each post and Gitea's permissions apply unchanged. That needs their access token, which lives in the database and never in a cookie: Flask signs cookies but does not encrypt them, and a token is enough to commit as its owner. Gitea expires tokens after about an hour, so they refresh ahead of expiry and retry once on rejection — without that, saving would start failing partway through an afternoon for no reason the writer could see. Publishing is admin-only. Posting to the internal board and publishing to the public site are different permissions, and the second is the larger grant. Listing caches frontmatter against the git blob sha, because the contents API returns names without bodies: that turns one request per post on every page load into one request in total, and needs no invalidation, since a sha changes only when the file does. Verified: 97 checks. The filename translate.py parses, an authored source that is_generated() rejects, the freeze toggle round-tripping, a stale sha refused with the other edit intact, six filename shapes that must 404 including a generated sibling, plain members refused, an SVG rejected as an image, uploads not colliding, the cache reading each file once and refreshing when it changes, and a preview that renders markdown, escapes script tags and publishes nothing. Smoke-tested live: routes register and gate correctly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn |
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Claude
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6ac814475e
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Add a members area: roles and an internal board
Everything on this site so far has been a file built from git. This is the first component that runs code to answer a request and the first whose data git does not hold, so the trade is stated in the README and the backup script is not optional. Roles are owner, admin and user. The owner is seeded once from BOARD_OWNER and cannot be seeded again, because otherwise editing a compose file would be a quieter way to take the top role than asking for it; ownership moves only by transfer, inside the app. There is exactly one owner and a partial unique index enforces it, so the invariant holds even when a handler is wrong. The owner is beyond suspension and demotion by everyone, themselves included. Only the owner makes admins; admins make users. Sign-in goes through Gitea as a confidential OAuth client — the opposite of Decap, which has to be public because it runs in the browser. The rule the whole thing rests on is that a Gitea account is not a membership: entry needs an active row in `members`, or every account on the instance is a member, starting with the translations bot. Admins can delete any post; nobody can edit anyone else's, admins included. Taking a post down is visible to its author. Quietly rewriting it is not, and an admin who could do that could leave a sentence attributed to someone who never wrote it. The plan said admins could do both; this is the one place the implementation departs from it. Markdown renders with raw HTML disabled, which is the entire XSS defence and the reason there is no sanitiser: the renderer emits only its own tags and escapes the rest. The CSP carries no 'unsafe-inline', which makes an inline onsubmit silently inert rather than broken, so the confirmation dialogs live in a static file and a test fails any template that grows an inline handler. GDPR is in scope rather than deferred: erasure removes the member row and moves their authorship to a tombstone so the conversations around them still read, and any member can download their own writing. Verified: 63 checks pass, covering the membership gate, every role predicate, a direct insert of a second owner being refused by the index, atomic ownership transfer, CSRF, an offsite login redirect, script tags rendering as text, soft deletes leaving both listings and exports, and the member screens rendering for each role. Smoke-tested live: headers, both static assets, and the bare /comunidad redirect that the Caddy matcher has to cover. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn |