Phase B. Images on threads and comments, stored in /data/uploads — inside the volume that already holds board.db, so there is one directory to back up rather than two and no second mount to remember. Not in the site repository, which is the distinction that matters: the content editor uploads by committing, and a private photo committed there would go through the build pipeline and out onto vienalatina.com. The type is decided by the first bytes, not the filename. content.py trusts the extension, which is tolerable where Hugo serves the result; here we serve it back, so an HTML file called gato.png would be a script running on our own origin. Five magic-number checks, no new dependency. The uploaded name is kept only as text to show a person; the name on disk is generated. Staging is separate from saving so a refused picture cannot leave a half-made thread behind. Threads and comments are soft-deleted, so the serving route checks the parent is still live. Without it, taking a post down leaves its photo readable by anyone who noted the URL. And the hole this phase existed to close: backup-board.sh archived board.db and nothing else, so the first upload would have made the nightly backup silently incomplete while still reporting success. It now archives the uploads directory too, verifies the archive, and names the directory when it is empty rather than passing over it in silence. Tested by restoring: destroyed the directory, restored from the archive, compared bytes. IMAGE_EXTENSIONS moves to uploads.py and content.py imports it, so the editor and the board cannot drift apart about what counts as a picture. 46 new tests, 176 in total. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NizVpJ2dwzCbjCrTLCjeHn
157 lines
7.1 KiB
Python
157 lines
7.1 KiB
Python
"""Application factory for the members area.
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Served at /comunidad/ on the main domain, behind Caddy, alongside the static
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Hugo output and Decap. It is the only part of vienalatina.com that runs code to
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answer a request; everything else is a file on disk.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from flask import Flask, render_template
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from werkzeug.middleware.proxy_fix import ProxyFix
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from .db import close_db, init_db
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from .security import check_csrf, csrf_token
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URL_PREFIX = "/comunidad"
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def _env_flag(name: str, default: bool) -> bool:
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raw = os.environ.get(name)
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if raw is None:
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return default
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return raw.strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
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def create_app(overrides: dict | None = None) -> Flask:
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# Static files have to live under the prefix too: Caddy only forwards
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# /comunidad/*, so a default /static/… would fall through to the Hugo
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# file_server and 404.
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app = Flask(__name__, static_url_path=f"{URL_PREFIX}/static")
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# Caddy terminates TLS and forwards plain HTTP, so without this the app
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# believes every request arrived unencrypted and sends its redirects to
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# http:// — an extra hop, and a moment where the session cookie could
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# travel in the clear.
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#
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# Trusting these headers is only safe because the container binds to
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# 127.0.0.1 and nothing but Caddy can reach it. Expose the port and a
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# client can forge its own address and scheme.
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app.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(app.wsgi_app, x_for=1, x_proto=1, x_host=1)
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app.config.update(
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SECRET_KEY=os.environ.get("BOARD_SECRET_KEY", ""),
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DB_PATH=os.environ.get("BOARD_DB", "/data/board.db"),
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GITEA_URL=os.environ.get("GITEA_URL", "https://git.vienalatina.com"),
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OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=os.environ.get("BOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID", ""),
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OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=os.environ.get("BOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET", ""),
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ADMIN_TOKEN=os.environ.get("GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN", ""),
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OWNER_LOGIN=os.environ.get("BOARD_OWNER", ""),
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BASE_URL=os.environ.get("BOARD_BASE_URL", "https://vienalatina.com"),
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# The repository the editor commits to — the same one Woodpecker builds,
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# which is what makes publishing from here indistinguishable from
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# publishing from Decap as far as the pipeline is concerned.
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CONTENT_REPO=os.environ.get("CONTENT_REPO", "pablo/vienalatina"),
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CONTENT_BRANCH=os.environ.get("CONTENT_BRANCH", "main"),
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# Outgoing mail. Without MAIL_HOST the app still runs, but nobody
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# can be invited or recover a password, so the admin screens say so
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# rather than failing at the moment somebody presses send.
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MAIL_HOST=os.environ.get("MAIL_HOST", ""),
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MAIL_PORT=os.environ.get("MAIL_PORT", "587"),
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MAIL_SECURITY=os.environ.get("MAIL_SECURITY", "starttls"),
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MAIL_USER=os.environ.get("MAIL_USER", ""),
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MAIL_PASSWORD=os.environ.get("MAIL_PASSWORD", ""),
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MAIL_FROM=os.environ.get("MAIL_FROM", "Viena Latina <hola@vienalatina.com>"),
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URL_PREFIX=URL_PREFIX,
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COOLDOWN_SECONDS=int(os.environ.get("BOARD_COOLDOWN_SECONDS", "20")),
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SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY=True,
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SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE="Lax",
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# Off only for tests and local http; on the server this must stay true
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# or the session cookie travels in cleartext the first time someone
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# types the address without https.
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SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=_env_flag("BOARD_COOKIE_SECURE", True),
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME="vl_board",
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# Generous enough for a photo off a phone. The board itself needs a
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# fraction of this; the editor uploads images, and a writer whose
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# picture is silently refused has no way to tell what went wrong.
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MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH=10 * 1024 * 1024,
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UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=int(os.environ.get("BOARD_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES", 8 * 1024 * 1024)),
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# Board pictures, deliberately inside the volume that already
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# holds board.db: one directory to back up, not two, and no
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# second mount to remember when moving the app to a new box.
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UPLOAD_DIR=os.environ.get("BOARD_UPLOAD_DIR", "/data/uploads"),
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)
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if overrides:
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app.config.update(overrides)
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if not app.config["SECRET_KEY"]:
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# A generated key would "work" and silently log everyone out on every
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# restart, which is a confusing way to find out the variable is unset.
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raise RuntimeError("BOARD_SECRET_KEY is required (generate one with `openssl rand -hex 32`).")
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from . import auth, board, content, members, uploads
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app.register_blueprint(auth.bp, url_prefix=URL_PREFIX)
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app.register_blueprint(members.bp, url_prefix=URL_PREFIX)
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app.register_blueprint(content.bp, url_prefix=URL_PREFIX)
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app.register_blueprint(uploads.bp, url_prefix=URL_PREFIX)
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app.register_blueprint(board.bp, url_prefix=URL_PREFIX)
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app.teardown_appcontext(close_db)
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app.jinja_env.globals["csrf_token"] = csrf_token
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app.jinja_env.globals["url_prefix"] = URL_PREFIX
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@app.context_processor
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def _year():
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return {"current_year": datetime.now(timezone.utc).year}
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@app.before_request
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def _before():
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# Order matters: reject forged writes before any handler can act on
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# them, but after the member is known so errors can render the chrome.
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auth.load_member()
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check_csrf()
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@app.after_request
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def _harden(response):
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# The members area must never appear in a search result. Both halves
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# are needed: robots.txt asks crawlers not to fetch, this tells the
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# ones that fetched anyway not to index.
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response.headers["X-Robots-Tag"] = "noindex, nofollow"
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response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
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response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "same-origin"
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# No 'unsafe-inline'. Two consequences worth knowing rather than
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# rediscovering: an onsubmit="" or onclick="" attribute in a template
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# is silently ignored (see static/board.js), and a markdown image
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# pointing at another site will not load — which for a private board is
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# the right answer anyway, since an external image is a request that
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# tells someone else who read the thread and when.
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response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
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"default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; frame-ancestors 'none'"
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)
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return response
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@app.errorhandler(400)
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def _bad_request(error):
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return render_template("error.html", code=400,
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message=getattr(error, "description", "Solicitud inválida.")), 400
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@app.errorhandler(403)
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def _forbidden(_error):
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return render_template("error.html", code=403,
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message="No tienes permiso para hacer esto."), 403
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@app.errorhandler(404)
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def _not_found(_error):
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return render_template("error.html", code=404,
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message="No encontramos esa página."), 404
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@app.errorhandler(413)
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def _too_large(_error):
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return render_template("error.html", code=413,
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message="El mensaje es demasiado largo."), 413
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init_db(app)
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return app
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